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By letter of 25 March 198o fron the Secretary{ieneral of t}re European
Parllament, the Polltlcal Aff,alrs Comnltteo was euthorized to draw up B report
on relations betlreen the European rarliqpent and the council of the connunity.
on 3l ilanuary lggo !r[r K. Bfnsch was appointed rapporteur.
The report was drafted by tJle subcommlttee on rnstitutLonal problems,
which adop,ted it on 4 December 1990.
The PoliticaL Affairs Committee consLdered this draf,t report at its
meetings of 17-18 Februaryr 17-19 March and 2r, 22 and,23 April r9gr,
tadopting the report by 29 votes to one, with three abstentions, on the rast-
mentloned date.
Presentr Drr Runor, chairmani Mr Eaage:rup, vice-chairmani !r!r E{,nsch,
rapporteur; tlre Baduel+].orLoso (for I{r Berringuer), Mr Berkhouwer,
trlr Blumenfeld, Mr Diligent, Lord Douro, ]1r FergusEon, !,ll! Fisc]rbach, Ur Forth(for Mr J.M. Taylor), IttrE Fourcade (for lar f,alor), &Ir B. Frieds:ichr
ur Habsburg, l[rs Eamneridr, Mrs van d,en Eeuvel, Mr rErael (for ur dE Ia ualEne),
Mr C. .TackEon (for Lady Elles), tr[r Kappos (for Mr Ansart), Mr Klepsch,
Irtr Lomas, Mr Pendersr Mr Radoux (for Mr EEtLer) r llr Romualdi, Mr Schal1,
Sir .Tames Scott-Hopkins, Mr Seefeld (for Mr Brandt), Mr Segr6, Sir ,lohn
Stewart-CJ.ark, Mr Tindemans, Mr Van Miert, Mr Vergeer and Irlr Zagari.
The opinion of the rcaar Affairs comnLttee is attached.
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ATh€ poLitical Aff,alrs committee hereby submltB to the EuroPean
Parliament the followinE motsion for a roEolution togothor with explanatory
statements
MOfroN goB A RESOT,L'TrON
on relatlons betwesn th6 European Parlianent and the councll of the
European Comnunltieg
The EuroPean Parliamant.
- consciou8 that sLnce the conununity is a union of democratic Etates all ite
deciaions must take into account the intereste both of the Corrmunity and
of the individual ttember StateB, and that these two componentE of tha
declsion-makingprocessmustbereprEBentadinabalancedmanner'
. 
- lehereas the council of, the Europgan conurrunitles remains the cdrnmunity insti-
tution in which governments repr€eent the Mernber States andt thbi.r interests,
- convinced that the European Parlianent - together with thE corunission
whlch is accountable to lt - must sincE its direct election increasingly
represent conrmunlty int€rests vie-i-vis the council,
- believlng that th6 political and inEtitutional develoEnent of the community
over tho last twenty years has reduced the overall capacity of the council
and Comnisslon to oPerate and take decisions'
- whereas
- 
firstly, by largely suspendlng, as a regult of t,he .I.uxembourg
compromise., the majority principle l.aicl dorn in the Treaties, the
council ha8 attained a predominant position not intended in the
Treatieg and has thus reduced the influence of the other Institutions
on the legislative Procesai
-secondIy,foI1orin9thedirecteIectionsprovidedforintheTreaties
and agreed upon by the national govornments, ParlianerrL iras recereed an
autonornoue and direct deneratic legitlmation and hence greater political
force,Y€t,itieEtillnotadeguatelylnvolvedinCommunitydecisJ.ons,
having regard to the rePort of the Po}ltical Affairs committee and the
opinion of tha I,egal Affaire Comnittee (Doc. L-2L6/aL)'
I. (a) Renewe its claim to the rlght to Participate in decisiong on all
matters p€rtaining to the European Comnunity; in particular in respect
of the legLelative procoes and the appolntment of the Commission of the
European Communiti6B,'as provided for in the report by Ml Jean REY
adopted on L7 APrll 1980;
- 
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(b) Remlnds the goverrunonts of the Cornmunity of the flnal declaration
of the parls eummit conference of, 1974, in which the heads of
goverrunonts announcEd their intention to cxtend parliament's
powers 'r-n particular by granting lt certain povrers in the
comnunity's regisrative procesg, and calre on the gov€rnmsnts to
extend the rightE of Parlianent ln the apirit of thie declaratlonl
2. (a) Notes that while a corresponding revLeion of the Treaties muld be
neceasary in order for it to acguire the right of co-decigion due to it
by vlrtua of its democratic legltimation, it iE aleo possible to increase
ite influencc on community decieions within the existing proviEions of
the Trettiest
(b) Declareg therefore that firet of all full advantage muet be taken of,
every opportunity afforded by the Traaties to increase Parlianent'e
influence on the-dacislon-rnaking proceEs of the Corununity;
(c) Urgeg the Council to take, together wtth Parllament, in parti,cular through
iolnt declarations, the practlcal stepE outlLned in tihls report towards a
more balanced and nore effectlve Comunlty decision-maklng- process that is
derrocratically legitlmated at both aational and Community level;
(d) Regards such joint declarations by Council, Commission erd Parliament as
both neeeaoary and feasible, eapeclally ln the fields of exchanges of
informatl-on, consultation and concillation on Lnternal and foreigfn
1issues and In the budgetary procedure;
(e) Is aware that ParlLament itself can contribute to making the Community's
activities more efficient, yet requests the Council to help in this by
improving its working methods and, with the aid of the measures propoeed
here, to enable all the organs to act effectively in keeping with the
importance agcrlbed to them by the lteatieE;
' ':_,-
It should be pointed out that ParlLament wlIl conslder in due eourse a
detailed report on participatlon in the development of externaL relatlonE.
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INFORIATION --\__ 
____
3. wercomee th€ Practice whereo, 
"l"n il"Ju.t" tt- the Council delivers
a speech before Parliament on entering offica, detailing the objectiveE
to be pursued during hie term, and hopea that this will be contlnued;
requeEtB, ho,vever, that tha Councll Presldent's Etatomont be submitted
to Parliament ln wrlting Eufficiently in advance to engure that -
after a brief Introduction by the councll president - Parliament can
hold a prepared debate on the statementt
4. Rogrets thBt the Council's answerE to written and oral questione
by uembere of the European Parllament are f,requently too unLnformative
andguggegtgthatinfuturethecouncilshouldgivenoreexhaustive
anawers,
5. ltishes the work of the cormrltteee to be more closely invoJ'ved in the f low
of inforrnatlon between council and Parllarnent and feelE that there ought
therefore to be regular f,ormal Contacts batween ite committeeE and the
'gPecializedCouncllEanotonlythroughlndivldualagreementsbetweenthe
rapporteur,thecqurritteechairmenandthePresidentoftherelevant
epeciaLizea Councitr but also including the appearance of Minieters before
the relevant parliamentary conmittee at the beglnning of each presidency
so as to explain the poltcy they trieh to pursuel
6. Coneidere it partlcularly useful Ln thle eontext that for the''hldgotary
procedure, in whieh Parliarnent and the council together constitute the
budgatary authority the council should be represented at meetings of
parliament'g Committee on Budgets and that Parliament should be kept more
fut ly Informed by the councll about tts deliberatlons on budgetary maetersi
CONSI'LTATION
7. Notes that the arrangements laicl dlqrn in thg Ereatles f,or the consuit"tiott
of parliament before the Council takes a. decieion can and muet be i'.rnproved,
ancl denands that ttris longegt-etanding and important right of parliament
to participate ln the legislative Procese be fuLly reepectecl by the
Council;
8. Takes the view that the Council's practLce of coneulting it as a mBtter
of courEe, not only in those cases prescrlbedt by tshe TreatieE but aleo
before any act of legislation, must be contlnued, and considerE that it
would be uaeful for thiE procedure to be fonnally Laid down;
PE 67.O24/ fLr.-
9. Demands, in the ffeia ot ftretgr, .if"fr",-*r"t before tfre Councif concludes
agreementE in the corununity'E nam€ with thlrd countries' groups of stat€s
or interdatsional organizatLons, it shoultl extend the consultdtion that
isatpresentrequiredonlyl.ncerlai.ncaSegunder}rticle228ofthe
EEC Treatyr lnd the confidential consultation of the lnrllanentary comnittees
whlch wae introduced as a regult of I'nter-instttutlonal accords' to all
agreementEconcludedonthebaaisoftheCotmrunityllreatieEbeforethey
are signed;
10. Does not dleny that it nay be of, advantag€ to the community's activitLeE for
the councit to adopt outline decisione whlch ar€ not epeclfied in Artlcle
IEgofthaEECTreatyorelsewher€'urgeEtheCouncil,howerrer,notto
replacedecieionetakenunderArticlelEgwlthEuchoullinedecisione
therebyeircumventingthenomralprocedurereguiringParliamenttobe
consulted;
1].(a)ltoquestBtheCounciltoundertakeinajointdeclarationtotakefull
accountinltsdeclsionsofsuchfurtheropinionsasParllamentnay
eonsideritnecesearytodeliveronltsowninitiativeinthelight
of new circumstances or legar developments affecting a proposal
fromtheCornmlEsionforalegielativeact;
(b)UrgestheCounciltorepeatitsconsultationofParliarnentunder
theleglslativeprocedurewhenevertheCorrunissionamendEitsoriginal
proposalonwhichParliamenthasalreadydeliveredanopinionand
such amendments have not been conEldered by Parliament;
L2.Demandsthatthecounciltakenodeciatonon'comissionproposalEbefore
thecdtlnissionhaseithergrrbrnlttedanamendedproposalconformingto
Parlianent.eopinlon,orhaBgivenParll.amentanexplanationofthe
reasons for not doing so;
13.UrgesthePresident-in-officeofthecounci}tocontinuethepractice
etartedgqtretlmeagoofforwardingParliament.Eresolutlons-boththoee
embodyinganopinionandthoseithasadoptedoniEsownpolitical
initiative - to the gorrern$entg of the Metnber states as rapidly as possible;
L4.DemandsthattheCouncilinfuturefullycorplywiththeundertakings
given by ita Presidentss-1n-Office, !{! Harmel and t{r scheel' on 20 }tarch
IgT0and22JuLylgTorespectively,byinformlngearllamentofthe
reasonsforwhichthecouncllhagfailedtoactuPonParliament'sopinion,
whenever thie is the case;
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CONCILIATION
15.(a)Urg6Bthecounclltoextendtheconciliationpreedurelaiddounin
thedeclarationof4!{arch19?5toalloft}recorrmission'sproposals
Eo the counciL to which PErlianent attaches especia]' iurportance and
onwhichitregueststhattheconciliationproeedurebeopenedwhen
itdeliversitsopinion;andconsidersthatthelegalactswhich
mightbethesubJectofconciliationahouldincludethoeeconcerning
the further conetitutlonal development of the cqrrrunity and deciaions
on apecific Comnunity policlea- t'
(b) Rep.Bts the dernand made In its reEolution of 17 april 19802 that it
should be coneulE€d fornally and in ttre early stages of negotiations
ontheaccegsionoffurtherstatestothecqnmunityandcallsonthe
councir and comnrission to propose to the Member states preeduree
whlch wourd permlt parrlament to exerciee itE right to participate in
such ad3ustments to the Treatiec as Ere already regally subject to a
concillation procedure ln the caee of autoiromous amendnent;
Wishes to strengthen ite influence on the Council's decisions
through corlaboration at a suitable Juncture on aetreements with
thlrd countries, groups of states or international organizations'
and therefore protrroses that where Parliament rejects such a
text, agreement ehould be sought through a conciliation
procedure; the Political Aff airs Corrml.ttee is asked to prepare
a rpre detailed report on these matters;
16.(a)Takestheviewthat,theregueatedextensionoftheareainwhich
coneiliatlon may be held shouldl bo accomPanied by a tightenlng-up of
proceduresandanoreefflcientorganizationofworkwithlnthe
Conciliation Committee ;
(b) Feels that there should be an €:<act ctefLnition of the presidency's
role and better coordination of concurront concili'ation proceduleE'
in lIne with the proposals of the 'Three I{Ige l{en';
(c)
\f- irn3iuuii. it i" 3 6i, 1, i rr,, toulno. k B?, .i3' r{$' n}}3trt' t' 128
2contalned in the stumenfeld report, Ee€ DG ' L-4g/8o
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.-*....(c) CaIIs on the Eounci-ffiye'to-85-I@-represented in the conciliation
procedureandtogivesufficientPow€r6toitgrepresentatlvesto
enEer into negotlations,
(d) Intends for ite part to do its utmoet to incroase th6 efficiency of
the contribution of Parlianent's dlelegatLon to the work of the
Coneiliation Cournittee ;
(e) wishes to draw uP, together wlth the Council, inprorred ruleg on the
lime Iinlts for conciliation procedureg, to take account of, the need
on the one handl to reach a clecision withLn a reasonable period and on
the other not to conplicate the eettlenent of difficult matters by
funposLng inappropriate tlme lirnitst
(f)DemandethattheCouncilglveanun,dertaklngtot,akeadecislon
follorlng conciliatlon wlthin a perlod fixecl by the congiliatLon
committee;
BrrpG-ETARlr PRGEDURE
17. PoinEs out that Parliament wlll ln due courge, in connection particularly
with the fortheoming extanBion of the F,inancial Begulation ae regulred under
the Tr:eaty, nake proposals for improvj.ng the buclgetary procedura and the
i.mplementation and control of th€ budget, and - without wl'shinE to
anticipate thesa propoeals - sets oqt lts rmin-views on the protection
and necessary extension 'of, ite legal status trs an'arn -of the budgetary
authority aa follolsl
IE.UrgesthecouncilfullytorespectParliauent'srightofdei,sion,aga
budgetary authorltyr o\7oE non-comPulsory e:cpenditure and not to undermine
It bY leglalative measuree bY
- 
setting cellingE, in the regulations in respect of which such expenditure
is incurred, for the reguired budget appropriations which the budgetary
authoritylsreeponslble,undertheEreatyrfotralleating;'
.requirlngindividualregulationstobeadoptedforeachprojetwithl.n
the frameyrork of, the fund appropriations already approved by ParlJ.anenti
- r0- PE 67.024/f,,LA.
t9. (a) Urges the Council not to infringe on the Comniseion's responsibility
to implement the budlget under Article 205 of the EEC Treaty since thls
encroaches upon Parliament's conaltutLonal rlght under Artlcle 206b
of tha EEC Treaty to supervise the manEgernent of, the budget andl grant
a discharge ln this resPect;
(b) CaIIB theref,ore for the 'Consultative CcmmLttees' set uP by the Council
to Eupport the Cmlsslon to be confinEd to a purely consultative
func tiont
(c) Demande equal involvcment
on bagic Po).icY regarding
provlded for in the case
ciliatLon Procedure;
Jr"""l in .il c"*"iiis decision-tar-Gs -
che cormitment of appropriatione to that
of general leElelatlve acts under the con-
23.
(d) Recalle the baglc structure of the new finarrcLal system of the Europaan
Communities (1970 and 1975). Itrla nakes the EuloPean Parliament the
body responsible for monitoring the proposal of the Cqmittee on Budgets
and delivering the discharge. Ihe Council thus no longer has the right
to freeze the budget aiTainst the will of the Commlssion and Parliament.
Iransfers of appropriations are essentially a natter for Parliament's
decislon-naking gtructure. lltre Flnanclal Regulation should be anended
accordinglyl
BnphasizeB the fundamental eguality of the Council and Parliament aE arns
of one and the same budgetary authority and caLls for the same equality to
be eEtablighed as regarde mutual lnformation and publicityl
Elnphasizes that respect for ttre epirit and the letter of the prwislons on
establishing the draft budget (Article 203 of the EEC lteaCy) is an essential
prerequieite for a conElructive dlalogue withln the budgetary authority'
and that only by working together can council and Parliament elimlnate
divergent lntarpretationa when applying srrch prorieionsr
calls for better coordination of the councll's and Parliament's activities
durlng the budgotary procedure and ref,ers to the practical proposals put
fonward by the Cmrittee on BudgetE in thig connection;
EnphaBizes once again that certain fundamental questions mugt be Eettled
outBide the actual budgetary preedure by neans of concllLation' in particulart
-,the atruclure of the budgetr
- 
the incluslon of all finarclng ingttunonte'
- 
the dletinction betwaen ccrrpulsony and non-comPulaory expenditure,
- 
the budgetary trcatnent of appropriatlona for nultiannual proJectal
Demands that the Councit, even when operatlng as the Council of Finance
filiniaters, [ruBt, alwaye be fully responeiJcle and have the authOrity to take
decieions and mu6t act in coordination and agrament with the leglslatlve
activitiee of the other Councllg.
20.
2L.
22.
24.
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COhISIDEN,ASIN OF. EBE COIIEIL'S !'ORI(
25. points olrt that the work of the councll has a direct lnpact on the
effeetlveness of the increaalng actlvl.tLes of Parliament ln partlcular and
the conmunity in general; and aocordltngly urges the council to set ln
hand the long overdue reform of lta lnternal gtructure and workLng rncthodle
in the light of the numerous proposBls nade, for inetancc, l11 the report
of thc '1[hree wlse !{ent;
26. (a) RecaIIs the flnal comnunigue of t*re Paris sununlt conference in 1974
which gave an assurance tlrat the Council would retura to majorlty
decision-naklng. and the cormrissLon'g dernand of !'[arch L978 for a
returntoruaJoritydeclsionsbeforetheeecondenlargementofthe
Cornnunity,SDdcallgupontheCounciltoreverttothedecision.
nraklngprocedureBEtiPulatedlntheTreatl.esasthenormalnrle;
' w'JT,f
(b) Demands t}at the clain by a lrlenber State that an
interest' 4
Lssue Is of 'vLtal
'.: should be
recognlzed as an exceptlonal eaee requiring justification by u,te
' delegation concerned, especlally ln ttre case of proposals that
have been endorEed by a large maJorLty of the Errropean Parliament;
27. lrgea members of the councll to lnake nore frequent uge of abstention in
order to facllitate deciEionE;
28.(a)consi(ler!.thattherenugtbeclogercoordinationoftherrarious
specialiat councils, and systenatic and effective eupervision of, the
committees and workLng partles reeponslble to the council, in order
to speed up the decleLon-maklng process as a whole;
(b) Takes thc view that the chief reeponsibitity for thig Lies with the
Foreign uinlgters, anil Ln particular' with the reLevant President-
in-Offlce;
Calls on the CouncLl to translate lts repcated declarationE of intEnt
lnto practice and make uec of Article 155 of the EEC TrBaty to transfer
power morc often and more comlrrehsnelvely to tha CoEnieeLon f,or the
lmplencntatlon of the leglslatlon lt has enacted;
Instructe ltr Pregident to fonrerd thls reeolutlon to the Councll and
commLsElon of the Communities, lnd to the governmenta of, the llEnber
States, rnd ca1le. oa the Counoll:.aadl'CoalCEdon to aitify.Parll'riripnt
of tlre action taken''on'tlri'c'relDtt':'Iy-t'hc'ltad of, 19sr' '' irr'u'i':"
29.
30.
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EXPT,ANATORY STATEMEIE
1' More than a hundred million citlzens of, the cornmunity have erectedtheir parliament directly for the fl.rEt tine. Ihls requlres and Justi.fiesa revie'r and reorganizatr-on of the European lnstltutlons, terms ofreference and responsibilities- The relations between parliament and thecouncir must be of such a nature as to help the community achreve thefollowing two aims:
- 
to strengthen the desrocratic legitination of community decisions bygiving the directly elected parliament greater influence on communitypolicy;
- to restore and strengthen the capacrty of the councrr and the commlseionto operate and take decisions, partrcurarly in view of, the second en-largement of the communityr o. the basls of more balanced cooperatronbetween the tnstitutions.
rf the requirements Eet out ln this report are satisfied, the communitywill come cloEer to achievlng these aims. TheEe requirements are juetifledby the banal fact that the community rs a unlon of states and that thesestates are democrattc' so the comnuntty can survive and develop onry lf ar,its decisions satisfy two criteria:
- they must be baEed on rures which ar6 aE democratlc in letter and splr*tas those governing deciEions by natlondl states, i.e. there nust beadequate denocratic parliarnentary regitimation at co*nunity level,
: and they must be rn the intereet both of the national statee and of thecommunrty, i.e- these two components of the decision_making process mustbe represented ln a balanced manner.
Nelther criterion is furry satisfied in the comnunity of 19g1.
2' (a) There .s an increasing lack of regitimation in the councl'sdecisions. This is not, horrever, to deny the council,s lmportance as acommunity instltution or cast doubt on its denocratic legitimatl0n. Thecouncil stlll can and muet refrect the abLcting importance of each natronaLstate in the devel0pment of the community. parllamentl however, on thebaeis of lts nerp authority and acttng together with the commlssr.on, *rich isaccountabre to lt must ensure that Europe,E communitles are more croseryinvolved in the Communlty,s decislon_making procesa.
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In fact, parliament's potential influence in no way corresponds to
its autonomous democratic legitirnation. Thtq.rneans that a denocratic force
which is becoming increaslngly necessary to legltimate Cornmunlty dlecisione
ls not beinj used to the fulI. Durlng the period of construction of the
Economic Community the decisions taken were merely deslgned to abhleva the alms
laid down in the Treatl-es, and the Eubstance thereof was viztually pre-
determined by the ratification by the natlonal parliamente of, the Treatlee
egtablishing the communlty. Today the comnunlty ls exerelzlng an lncresslngly
dlrect and lasting influence on the liveE of ltE citlzens by lts measures to
approximate laws and its common policy deciElons. Thie applies as much +-
the flxing of agricultural prices as to declslons on a common transport
poJ.icy, to eliminating barriers to trade as to protectlon of the environment
and to energy pollcy as to industrial policy.
The Community makeE decisions affecting society with such scant-i
parliamentary legitinatlon as would be inconceivable in the caEe of national
decisions of the same type. It is pure fiction to say that the Councll is
acting in a ilemocratlcal-Iy responsible manner vis-i-vls lte national
parJ-iaments and is controlled by them. Firstly, since the Councll'e delibera-
tions take place in camsra and no national parllament is able to control its
government's action in the Council or to lnfl-uence lts decieions. Secondly
because the national parlianents are involved ln the Ccmnunity legislatlve
prccess only insofar aE Comnunity law still hae to be transpoEed lnto national
}aw. This is the case for directiveE, which represent only a srall proportion
of Community legislatlon. Even here the natLonal parliaments are Left very
little margin for deision-making. llhe vast majority of CouncLl and Cmission
deciEions have direct force of law in the !{ember States, as shqun by an
example taken from the FederaL nepublic of Gernany. Frcm ilanuary 1978 to
June 1980 the German Bundestag received a total of 11822 derrments concerning
Council regulations and directivee and other deciEions of the Council" Of these
only 106 $.e/"1 vrere brought before the Br:ndestag in plenary eitting in ttre form
of an original dcument with a recomnendation for a decision fron the appropriate
Bundestag ccmnittee. In 64 cases the Courrcil'E decisions had already been
published in the Official ifournal, i.e. entered into force before the Bundestag
or the appropriate cmnittee had even discuseed thesr. l[tris example, which
reflects the situation in the other national parliaroents, shqre that the real
decision-making poleers and influence have long since been dlverted frorr the
national parliaments to the European cmunlQr without, hq,rever, finding a
parliamentary egulvalent there.
The European Parllament muet be glven the authority to .Esurne functions
which the national parliaments have long since abandoned or become unable
to carry out. Vlhat iE lnvolved therefore ls by no means the transfer of
further national powerE and responsibilitiee to the Cornsrunity but a re-
structuring of those that have already been transferred. In future parliament
must be able to filL the gaps in democratlc par!.lamentary procedure created
by the Community's decislon-making etructures.
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(b) The balance between the institutions must be improved. It is all
the more necessary to restructure their powers and responsibilities in that
the Council not only fuJ-Iy assumes the central position as clecision-making
power conferred on it by the Treaties but has actually built it up furthere
It has attalned a predominant position not intended In the Treaties by
J-argely suspending the majority principle laid down in the Treaties. It
has thus reduced the influence of the other institutions on the legisLative
process since all too often Commission proposals and the consultation of
Farliament on them require not only a majority consensus but unanimity in
the Council.
While the Council has been building up its position at the expense
o_f the other institutions, at the same time its working procedures have
become increasingly cumbersome it has become increasingly less willing and
ible to take decisions. Meanwhile Parl-iament, on the basis of a decision
by the national governments, has received autonomous democratic authority.
yet it still does not have a corresponding influence on Comnunity poJ-icy.
When the authority to take part in decision-making and the right of
participation lie so far apart, conflicts are bound to arise, to the detri-
ment of the Comnunity. These conflicts must be neutralized by enhancing
the Council's decision-making ability ancl strengthening Parliament's influence
in order to create a natural and fruitful relationship between institqtione
with different J-egitimations and tasks.
In this context Parliament refers back to the final ileclaration of the
L974 parLs Summit Conference in which the heads of governments announced
their intention to extend Parliament's powers '...in particular by granting
it cerEain po\^rers in the Community's legislative process'. Parliament must
put pressure on the governments to fuIfil this undertaking.
your rapporteur is submitting a comprehensive report to Parliament,
discussing all the areas in which Parliarnent's influence can be strengthened
and relations with the Council improved. These areas include two-way infor-
mation flows, consultation and conciliation in internal and external affairE,
budgetary procedure insofar as it gives rise to institutional problems, and
the Council's internal working procedures where they directly affect
Parliament's position in the Community. Naturally this report deals only
with certain aspects of budgetary procedure 6nd of the Council's working
procedures; in the case of budgetary procedure it needs to be supplemented
by a report by the appropriate committee and in the case of the Council's
working procedures, by the adoption by the council- of the proposale of the
Three Wise Men.
(c) Parliament can obtain more right to participate in Community
decisions only if the Treaties now in force, which confer sole tregislative
power on the Council, barring a few exceptions, are amended. It will prove
increasi-ngly necessary in the next few years to redistribute the various
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inetitutions' powers and responsibilities in order to brlng Parliament's
right of participation in line with its democrat,ic legitimttion.
yet parliament's demands ilo not go beyond the framerrork eet by the
existing Treaties. No amendments to the Treaties, deeigned to strengthen
the position of Parliament and the Community as a whole, can be made or
can take effect before the second direct election of Parliament in 1984.
parliament must take a different road if it wants to attain sufficient
influence on conmunity policy-making before these elections take place to
persuade the citizens of Europe that it is worth taking lnrt in a second
round of direct elections. Your rapporteur therefore draws a distinction
between Parliament's 
-r.!-qhtg. of participation, which can be increased by
amending the Treaties, and its influence, which can be strengthened within
the framework of the existing Treaties on the basis of inter-institutional
agreements.
(d) Joint declarations by the institutions concerned are an approprlate
means of strengthening Parliament's infruence. past experience favours thisprocedure. Hovtever, joint declarations must be very specific if they are to
faciLitate rather than impede the community's decision-making process. That
is why your rapPorteur attaches importance to a very precise and detailed
formulation of parl_iament,s demands.
By drawing up a detailed list of specific demands parl-iament will_
finally become able to monitor the implementation of its decisions more
successfully- rn any case Parliament must pay more attention than in thepast to the fate of its own resolutions and check carefully whether and to
what extent they are taken into account in the decisions of the council and
comrnission. That, is why the President is requested to notify parliament
within a certain time-limit whether and to what extent the institutions
concerned have taken action on the demands put fotr,ard in this resolution.
Then Parliament can consider and decide on further measures.
INEORMATION
3' lf Parliament is to make an effective contribution in the interpley
between the institutions, it must, be kept adequately informed of the
programme of work and the progress in the discussion and consideration of draft
l-aws and individual measures in the other community institutions. rts
dlal-ogue with the council and the commission serves this purpose. parliament
has gradualJ-y expanded this dialogue in the past and regards the measures
taken on the basis of the council decraration of 16-r0.L973 as a step fonrard.
The flow of information courd be further expanded and improved upon.
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When h€ takes off,ice, the actlng nrecLdlent of, the Counclt of lrlLnletere
dellvers a speech before Parlianent detaillng the obJectlveg to be pursued
during hlE term of offlce. ThlE glves Pafllanent an opportunlty toanalyse
the council's work prograrme in publlc, to cleliver itsoplnlon on that
programme and to make lts wishes knonn, e.g. on the key polnte of, the
Council's work. It can only ilo this, however, if it Is fully prepared for
the ilebate with the President of the Council. Your rapporteur therefore
proposeE requestlng the Council to submit the President's statement, ln
wrlting sufficfently In advance to ensure thgt, after a brief lntroductlon
by the Council PreE1dent, Parliarnent can holcl a weJ.l-prepared debate on the
statement. Parliament must aLso make an effort to hold its debateE on clatee
which allow time for a reaaoned dlscusElon.
It has been suggeeted in varlous guarters that the PreEldent of the
Council should also present a klndl of retrnrt of activitiEs to Parliement at
the end of hj.s period of office. Since the presidency changas every six monthE,
thig wouLd involve tvro progranne stateilEnts and two reports of, actLvitles a
year 
- a total of f,our gnlicy and progranne debates. Sudr an increase Ln the
nunber of policy debateE would dorngrade the slniches by the Presldent of the
Council and the Members, do nothing for ParlLBmentts image and hold bad< the
Conrnunity's practical work. The Etatement nade by the incomLng Council
President already gives an account of the preeedlng period of Presideney and
gJ.ves Parliament sufflcient optrrcrtunity to state its trnsition bef,or€ tlre
CouncLl and the publtc twice a f,ear.
4. Your rapporteur belleves that the Councll's answers to written and oral
guestlons are stlll a sultabLe means of estabLishing a more lntenslve dialogue
between the two lnstitutlons. This systen not only provideE Parltament with
information on speclfic questlons, but brtngs indlvidual issuee into the open
and thus acts as a factor of democratic pa.rllamentary control. But the
Council's anEwers are often too short and too untnformative. No doubt lt is
nore difficult for the CouncLl than for the Cornrnission, for example, to gLve
informative answers on whLch it has reached Internal agreement. But there Lg
certainly room for improvement, which is why your rapporteur proposes requestlng
the Council to glve more detaileil and comprehensive anEwers ln future.
5. The work of the committees Ehould be more closely involved ln the flovr
of information between Council and Parl-iament. Your rapporteur coneiderE
regular formal contacts between the parllarnentary cornrnittees and the relevant
Councils extremely ueeful and productlve. They offer an opportunlty for con-
fldenttal tn-clepth discussions on the further pursuit of Community pollcLes
and are often more informative than the angvrers to parliamentary q.uestions
whlIe al.so giving Parllament a chance to lnfluence the Councll-'s deliberations
by puttlng fonrard its own ideas.
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Sone comLttees, the Counlttee oa BranoporE and the Comtlttee on Energy
for oornple, hrve been accustomed for yeare to Lavlte the Preeldent of thc
appropriate ffiiEoft.trlonde or twice durlng hlg tea of office. Another ldea
would be to f,olIorr the example of the lJegal Aff,airs Couurittee and arrange
for question times on specific areas of the Couacll's activlties, rrith the
partlclpation of the President of the relevant Councll. Your rapporteur
considers that thE actual f,om of these coatacts choul.d be left to ad hoc
agree6ents bst\reen the rapporteur concerdbd, thq eonnlttee chairman and the
presldent of the Council concerned. So the reaolution confines lteali to
demanding acceptance of the prtnciple of, regular formal contacts betreen the
committeee and the councll.
6. It has been varlously requested that ltonbers of Parllament should oUtalir
the rlght to attend Council meetings and to speak on certain itemE. Your
rapporteur doeg not share this vlewl. WhiLe it ts true that thiE would glve
parliament flrst-hand knorrledge of the clellberatione in the Council and
allorr lt to express its opinlon there directly, Parllament wouLd aIEo run the
rlsk of becoming involved in the councll's work to the detfiment of Lts own
function In the network of Community lnstitutlons.
The Treatles allocate a specific role aadl epeclfic taEks to each
institutlon for which that inetitution is politically responsible. If
parliamentary representatives took an actj.ve patt in the Council'e deliberatlons,
the necessary dictlnetton nadle between the lnstltutions by the TreatleE would
no longer be sufflclently clear. l'loreover, it night l-ead to Councll decislone
being taken outaide the meetinge durlng {qEolmal preliminary talks and to
Members of Parllament becoming implicated, informally at least, in Counctl
declelone.
The sltuation as regards budgetary procedure Ls qulte dtff,erent.
Parliarnent and,the Council together constltute the budgetary authorlty. They
each have their orrn decislon-naking area and their orrn functione, but they
cannot produce an entlrely balanced budget ualese they work closely together.
The epeclal budget conciliation procedure largely meets thLs requj.rmnt.
your rapporteur regards lt aE advleable, however, tbat the- Council ,ahouLd *t I
keep ParLianeqt better trnf ormed, for erefiUllq, by alilqliog -it aoeesg .& &h"to.-
mlnutes of EqetingF of the Gouncil and of, the Pertblr€nt B€{Eeseffiativeii at
t hich EEttere felating to thq budget a,ie dieFu8sed.. lltrere are bthec. ,
1
- A group of 
.!,[edbers made euch a request ip. Fn urge1t procedure resolution sf26.7.L98o OFc.. L-282/80) but the resoluEion was.referrbE-byrtg6 plenary-
sltting to the Political Affalrs Commlttee in connection sith thls regort
on the rglatl-one between the Council" and Parllament.
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conceivable ways of imprwing the
representation of, the Comlttee on
on the budget.
flol of, information, including
Budgete at the Council's deliberations
CONSI,LTATTON
7. The arrangements laid dorvrn in the Treaties forthe consultatlon of
ParLianent before the Council takes a deciEion can and must be inproved.
This is the longest-standing and one of the most important rights of
Parliament to particilnte in the legisJ-ative process and the councll must
respect it fulJ.y. With a vierr to ParLiament's right of co-decision and
against the background of direct elections, this consul-ation must be re-
garded and treated not as an enpty formality but as a vital component of
decision-making. Since at present the Council has sole decision-naking
porrrer, it must take the opinions deLivered by Parliament as seriously as
Parliament'E increased importance requires. It should be remembered that
in its declaration of L6.L0.1973 to Parliament the Council stated that it
'had taken internaL measurea 'to ensute that Opinions given by the European
Parliament are taken into consideratlon,at every stage...' rn this way
it acknowledged its obligations and made provision for duly fulfllllng then.
8. Nevertheless, Parliament's oplnions are conEtantl-y being set asLde or
the eouncll. takes decisions without waitlng for ParLiament's opinlons.
Theisoglucose cases are very typical of the council's conduct. On
25 ilune 1979 the council issued a regulation fixing the isoglucose production
guotas for the L979/L98O augar marketing year in line with a prior decision
of the court of .Iustice on the corresponding basic regulation. This regulation
was based on Article 43 of EEC Treaty so consultation of Parliament c,as man-
datory. Yet the Council"took a decision without waiting for Parliament's
opinion. Parliament therefore decided in a resolution adopted in December
Lg79L that the regulation was lnvalid because it infringed Farliament'E
right to be consulted. In its decision of 29 Octobex L979 the Court of
ilustice found in Parliament's favour, noting that Parllanent must be able
to particilnte effectiveJ-y in the comrnunity's legislative process by belng
consuLted. It described consultation as 'an essentlal procedural require-
ment....whose infringement may leail to invalidation of the act....' The
supreme court thereby confirmecl that consultation is a baEic component of
the Conmunity's legislative process and must be conducted in such a way as
to ensure that the council takeE Parliament's opinions into account in lts
deliberations prior to taking a decision.
I 
,"" Ferri report, Doc. EP"L-478/7g
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The consultation procedure should be improved by the measures described
belorr. As a ruLe the Council does not consult Parllament only in those
cases prescribecl by the Treaties but before any act of legis1atioa. Your
rapporteur welcomes this practice and considers that it would be useful
for this procedure to be formally laid clown. That would al-so put a stop
to the Council,s dubious practice of occasionally altering the legal basis
of regulations or not mentioning it at aLl, thereby concealing the fact that
it has either not consulted Parliament in cases where thie is prescribed or,
as in the lsoglucose cases, has not waited for Parliament's opinion- If
the Council always consulted Parliament before taking a declsion, such con-
flicts woulct not J.onger arise. Dncreover, it is general.ly acknorrLedged that
the corpulsory consultation prescribed by t\e Treatles in certain cases is
not based on any coherent sYstem.
The formula sugg,estecl by the Commlssion couLd be adopted to define the
Council-'s broader obligation to consult Parliament. According to this
formula only minor decisions, urgent meaaures ancl confldential measures
should be exempt from consultation.
g. The consultation required before the Council concludes agreements with
third countrLeE or groups of states should be extended to all agreements
concLuded on the basis of the Comnunity Treaties. At present Parlianent
is involved only on a Eelective basis in the shaping of external relatione,
depending on the kind of agreement involved.
The compulsory consultation required under Article 228 of the EEC tsreaty
after the signing and before the conclusion of an agreenent applies only to
the individual- cases referred to in the Treaty, but not to trade agreements
pursuant to Article 113 of the EEC Treatyr oor to the enlargement of the
Community by the accession of new Member States pursuant to Article 237 of
the EEC Treaty, . dr6r to agreements purs-uaht to the Suratom and ECSC-
Treaties.
The cenfidential briefing of the parliamentary committees, lntroduied
as a reE u1t of interinstitutionat accords, on the content of the negotiations
prior to the signing of an agreement ('Luns-V[esterterp procedure') is
appJ.ied only 
,in the case of assoclation and bilateral trade agreements.
The present system of consuLting Parliament aloes not take adequate
account of the scoPe of the Community's external relations, which have
undergone dramatic changes in recent years. Netf, types of agreement, such
as multilateral trade agreements, raw material a.greements and agreements
on internatianal measures to protect the environment, have been negotiatedl.
They are no less important than the traditional types of agreement but have
a different legaI basls. The constantly changing nature of theee reLations
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demands constant monitoring of the relevant procedures and instruments.
Furthetmore, the Comnunity's external relationa are closely bound up with
its internal activities and the two areas are interrelated.
As regards internal Corumunity affairs (Legtslatiue and budgetary
procedure) Parliament has acquired, or is aiming at, greater por'rer. rt
muet therefore have more say in the formulation of external relatlons,
falllng which contradictions and friction might arise between the Comnualty,s
positions in lnternal and external relations, which would adversely affect
the harmonious development of community activity as a whole. your
raPporteur therefore propOses that the consultation provided for under
Article 228 of the EEc nreaty and the confidentlal briefing of the appropriate
committee introduceit by the Luns-westerterp procedure shouLd be extencled to
aJ-I agreemente with third countries.
obviously the whole House need not be coosulted on purely adruinlstratlve
agreements. Ho\,rever, even the extension or renewaL of an agreement may glve
rise to poJ-itical questions on which Parliament wishes to deliver its
opinion and must be al-l-owed to do so- Your rapporteur therefore proposes
the foLLowing proceclure: on principle aIl internatlonal agreements must
be eubmltted to Parliament's appropriate committee at an early date. on
the basis of certain criteria, which may where appropriate be agreed In
advance with the Council and the Commission, the committee would decide
whether the opinion must be submitted to Parliament in plenary sitting or
whethe.r a simprifieil procedure would satisfy parLiament's right to be
consulted.
I0. Your rapporteur does not deny that it may be of advantage to the
community's actirrities for the council t.o adopt poJ-icy decisions which
correspond, IegaIIy speaking, to the categories of decision referred to in
Article 189. Ihe decisions on industrial policy and on economic and monetary
unionr are exampres. They are communlty action programmes outrlning a
.ornitron policy in a specific area and fixing its implenenting timetable, and
can give a valuabLe impetus to Community policy.
Where the Council requests the Commission, in outline decisions of this
kind, to subrnit the appropriate proposals (Article L52'), there is generally
no probJ.em about Padiament-'s participation since Parliament stt1l has an
I on th. basis of a report by its Political Affairs Commlttee on relatLons
between Parliament and the European council, parllament wlLl in due coursedeliver an opinlon on the European Council's guideline decislons, whlch is
where this problem rnainLy arlses now.
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oPPortunitytogiveitsopinionontheCommission'sproposals.Butwhere
the council does not involve the commission, its decision remains the
basic clocument which may subsequently be treated as a binding guideline
for further comnunity actlon. This could so prejudice any fol-Iow-up
decisions in rrhich the other institutions must aLso be involved as to
reduce substantlally the Commission's and Parliameht's scope for action'
parliament must therefore make it clear that such council decisions cannot
replace declsions within the meaning of Article 189. No decisions of a
practical nature may be taken until the normal procedure, which lnclucles
consultation of Parliament, has been follovred'
ll.YourraPporteurpropogesthefollowingimprovementglnnorma].].egis-
Iative procedure: the council shoulcl re-consult Parliament whenever the
commission Eubstantial-Iy amends its original propoaal- on which Parliament
has already delivered an opinion and where the amendments involved have
not been coneiclered by Parliament'
12. Parliament quite frequently delivers an opinion on Commission proposals
in a form which no longer represents the basis for the council's decision'
That is becauEe the coNnission's right to propose is a multi-stage Process
and is exercized as such while consultation of Parl-iament on proPosals has
hitherto been confined to a single formal act. so the council- consults
parl-iament on the commlssion proPosal as submitted to the council and in the
f,orm in which the council received it. But the proposal is often amencled
substantial.ly by the time the council makes its declsion (second paragraph
ofArtic]-eL49).SowhileParliamentisdraftingitsopiniononthe
proposalinitsoriginalformroftenalengthyproceEs'theCommission
continues work on it, in regular contact with the Member states, in the
searchforcompromiseformulasonwhichadecisioncanbereached.
rf consul-tation is to be of aoy real use, it must be adapted to the
ways anil means by which the commission exercizes its right of proposal'
where the situation so requires, it must be divided into several stages'
i.e. the council must re-consuLt parriament on any substantlar changes to
the proposal. Should the commission agree to Parliament's reEolutlon of
17 April I98OI and consult Parllament prior to the submission of a propoeal
(andthereforepriortoanychangestoaproPosal)'yourraPPorteurwould
regard this procedure as adequate'
Parliament's right to deliver a further opinion on a Proposal ehould
also extend to the fairly frequent cases in which a Propogal appears in a
new light because of the Passage of time and changed circumstances Eo that
parl-iament,s original opinion is now out of date. The ComniEsion has the
1 
,"" repor! by ,rean REY, Doc - L'7L/8O of 14'4'1980
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rlght to withclraw an old proposal if it no longer regards it aE pertinent
or useful. SlmilBrly Parliament should be entltLed, if It regards this
as politicalJ-y necessary and if some time hae elapsed eince lts orlginal
oplnion without the Council taking action pursuant to Article 1-49, to
deliver a ne$, oBinlon whlch the Couneil must take lnto account in lts
deciEion.
In its declaratlon of 15 October L973 the Council stated its lntention
to take deciElons only after receiving Parllament's opinlon. To ensure
that thls opinion ie realJ.y taken into account in its clellberations, the
Council should speclfy that it will take no decision on Commission propoBals
before the commission has elther submitted an amencled proposal conforming
to parliament's opinlon or has glven Parliament an explanation of the
reagons for not doing so. This is the only way to ensure full consultation
on proposals on a basiE of cooperation between the three institutionE.
13. rn l-ine wlth its declaratlon that Par1f"."nt s oplnion 'wiII be taken
lnto consideration at evcry stage', the Counctl ls urged to contLnue the
practice etarted some timeryo of forsardlng Parliament's reEolutlons to the
governments of the Mernber States as rapidly as poes1ble. It is o<trenely
important for Parliament's opinion on certaln questions to be knorrn to all
the delegations in the council at aD,ea-ilfi iE6e befoiei-fh"y reac'FE:Hf6-E[--
decision. Moreover, Councll clecisione should aot be predetermlned by worklng
parties before the CounciL haE received Parliament's opinion.
14. In the l-etters from Council Presidentg Har-ne1 and Scheell, the council
undertook to inform Parliament in every case of the grounde on which it
failed to act upon Parliament's opinion. This should apply ln all cases of
real importance. At first this unilertaking related urainly to Parliament's
opinions on cornmunity instrumentg wlth financlal lmpllcatlons.and was de-
signed to heJ-p rernove the discrepancy between Parllament'E new budgetary
powers and its lack of participation in legislative decisione with budgetary
lmplications. Xn this context, the conclliation procedure introduced eub
eequently (see next section) brought further improverrents.
It is stlI1 very much in Parliament's interests, however, to be informed,
if only subsequently, exactly why its opinions were not or not adequately
taken lnto consideration. Thie can help it to update ite position on the
1 ot 20.3.1970 anct 22.7-l-:g7o
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q'ucs,fiogg, qoneefned1 Your rapporteur al,eo r.lrgss, Ditrllf;amerrt ts matr{e real. use
of, this, Lnstrunent whtch. ls an imBortamt meEms of'ashievlng a contLnuous.
dialogue w&th the Council.
Lasttry.your rcgpoateul? pt?opoaea ca,Iliangl sn the Csuneil to undsrtrake' to
keeB penliaraent frrJ,lry-intrormed thr:ough ilts^ appropariate aommltteeo otr the
progress. o the CsuncII'sl dellberations. on. ther'qomlse[on's- legieilatiue
;propoeal.,s end, ths. aaendrrents tablad to thm in: BEo:Llamsnt's oBi.nione.. Quite
agrart. from the,fundamEntal quaatlon of naki,ng. the democratlc legislatri,ue
procesa sufficl.sntllq tranaBarent,, wllich llour DEElIIostcEr wi.Il- not, go tnto
here, thts would be,of, great practical resilstarree to Parliament. Con-
sul,tation' lnvolves. Bar].lanent in the CoramunltLes'' Iegfs,lative ProceEs.
pa,rllament can,rmlca a. si.gniflcant eontribution oaly if It lg kept i,nforned
of the actl,vi,tl.es of the deci"sion-ma:klng"inEt^itution,. the council. Ihi,s'
infornatl,on rrouild, a,treo, help Pa.rlLampnt to: foraaulate i,t,E vierfla I,f a, sffond
opinion prove€ neceats&o?y or to', investtgF8a ctelhys in: the deeLstron-matred.ng
procedtrre in fuJ.I ltnorrvledge of th@ sGa&e"ofr tlte CsunsiL's, deliberatlsns.
CONCITIElftON
15., your ra.p;lorteur regards the, conelliration, Braocedure lai.d, down in the
,fuint DEclara.tion of 4 Itiarch 1975 as cEntratl !o.tshe lmSlrovement of relations
betwesn Burliament and' the Council-.
Ths-etate of play to date'is not vely encouraging. In the f,ive'yetrs
since the csncirl"tar&ion.procedure rms int:rodlrce*, onty three cEs€s have been
brought to a. Eucse,s,sf,ul eonclusion (Regl-onat Ftrnd,. ths'Ftnanci"al negulation
and the nela financia"l inetrunent known as- the l0rtoli facilltt'),. flwe other
pnocedures xratris- i.nitiated but have'not been concluded (finanei.al cooperetion
with third countries and uEe of the EUA In ther- Gorununlty'e legal scts); tn
f,ive o*Eee Parliament's requeste for conetliatlon were rejeeted. No ner
concili,ation prroeedure.has heen started sC.nce d{rect e!.ections and !.n only
onc case.haq, qn ongoing conct,Iiation procedture lreen reEumed ef,ter monthe of
interrr.rptlon (f:lnaneial a,i.d for non-asoociated: developing. cotrntrilee),.. '
Ther€ are many reasons for this situa,tj.on. Yat the conclllatlon pro-
cedure rernqine.the approprlate inatrument to euSlpl-emsnt cone'ultati-on and to
strengthen Ba,rliamont's influ€rnes on Council. policy wi.thout Easliament laying
clairn to genulne legislative powere, whtoh would r€quLre an anendnent of the
Treati.ee. So far, conciliation hae had little ctuccqse.. Thi,'e i.e. partly if
not largely, bseause Parlianant itEo!-f dose,not attach eufflcient import*neo
t'o it and has' nof encouraged it sysLemati"cal-J.y enough. It ie also becsuse
the fie{-d of appJ.ication rra.s too vaguely defined and bscause of the nature
of t,he proeedure itsel-f . Parliament shoul-d aim to improve both.
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The concillation procedure wae introduced in connection wlth
Parllamentrg new budgetary Powers. In a aense it supplements them ln the
Iegislative fietil. At preEent its field of appllcatlon renaLns smaLl. It
may be followed for 'Community acts of general application which have
appreciable financial implications, and of which the adoptlon lE not re-
quired by virtue of acts in exLstence' (paragraph 2 of the ,Ioint Declaration
of 4.3.L975). The third indent notes that 'the increase in the budgetary
poq,ers of the European parLiament must be accompanled by effectlve particip-
ation by the latter in the procedure for preparlng and adoptlng ileclsions
which give rlse to important expenditure or revenue to be chargeil or credited
to the budget of the EuroPean Communities''.
The experience of recent years has sholvn that thlE cleflnltion of the
fielcl of application is vague and too narrow. This is true of the phrase
'acts of general appJ.ication' for exampJ.e. In the question of lnterest
rebates granted under the European Monetary System, for instance, this
vagueness gave rise to dlfferences of oplnion: since the rebate was granted
only to some Menber States, the CounciL considered that the act waE not of
,general- application'. Nor has lt been decided whether the conciliation
procedure applies only to acts which have appreciable financial lnplications
for the budqet or aleo to others which, like cooperation agreements with
developlng countries, increaEe the volume of expendlture of the Development
Fund or, like the implementing ragulation on loans to promote investment
(Ortol-i facillttes), lncrease the expenditure of the'*eug6!"dan inveet'tne-nt ' '-'
Bank. These are both flnancing instrunentE outside the budget.
On the other hand, conciliation has proved guccesEful in severaL important
casea situated outside the framework deflnecl by the Jolnt Declaration of
4.3.Lg75. The first anil perhaps most successful conclliation to date, whlch
led to the establishment of the nff Flnancial ReguLatlon La L977, clld not in
the true senEe of the word concern an act to which the concillatlon procddure
could be applied because the E'inancial- Regulatlon as such hae no financial
1implications.l yet it is unquestlonably an act of 'general appJ-ication'
which cJ-early determines Parliament'g new budgetary rlghtE and thus defines
its contractual posltion in detaiL.
The direct election act of 2O.9.L976 is aleo a regulatlon whlch affectE
the rights of parllament aa a Conmunlty institution. Article 13 of the act
formally provldes for conciliation for any implementlng measuree that nay be
requirecl on the basis of the procedure Laicl dorrn ln the ifolnt Declaratlon of
1 A"ti"I" I07 thereof also prescribes concillation in respect of, Eubsequent
amendrnents
- 
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4.3.L975. A further instance of a baslc constitutional decleion reachedjointly by Council, Commlesion and Parlianent through the conclllatlon
procedure, although it fatls outside the actual J.eglslative field, is the
',foint declaratlon on the protection of basic rights in the Connunlty'1.
Your raPporteur coqsiders lt necessary to reclefine and o<tend the
f1eld of application of the concllLatlon procedure in order to avoid the
demarcation clifficulties that have arisen ancl to take account of parllarnent.s
stronger rot-e within the Community. Parllament should call on the Councll
to extend the conciliatLon procedure lald dorrn Ln the declaration of 4 I'brch
1975 to aLl Connission proposals to the Council to wl.i.ch the Barllanent
attaches especial importance and ln respect of which lt requeEts that the
conciliation procedure be opened when lt dellvers tte opinlon. It should
also be involved in the approprlate f,om Ln the shaplng of externaL relations
policy.
Acts in reepect of which the concillation procedure may be opened are
primarily declEione on the further constitutlonal development of the
Community ancl its enlargement. The vedel report of 25 llarch 1922 lietecl
these actE in tist e2. The examples glven of successful conclLtation
outside the r:.eua1 field of applicatlon already suggest that thls procedure
is being extended to acts concerning Parllament,s lnEtitutional posltlon
within the Comnunity. The instltution which representg the citizens of
Europe must participate in decleione of princlple on the further develop-
nent of the Comtrunitiee in the 'conEtltutlonal fleld,.
Secondly, the measureE to approximate legi.slatlon and baElc decielone
on cornrnon pollcies given in Llst B of, the vedel report3 should be subject
to conclliation. TheEe are pol-icy-naking measureE whlch have a 1astlng
effect on national law and the Life of the citlzen.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Artlcle 237 of the EEc rreaty
and the second paragraph of Article 205 of the Euratom Treaty, the condltlons
of admisslon of a new member of the connunLty and the necessary adjustnente
to the.Treaties must be agreed between the Member States and the appllcant
state. AE a rule this also neans anending rules whlch parliament had a say
in formulatlng on the baele of itE special partlclpatlon rlghts (see
1 of s.4. L977 Lo oJ c Lo3 p.I of 27.4.Lg77
2 rh.y include clecisions under Articles 20I (al.ready encompagsed by theJoint Declaration of 4.3.L975), 235, 236 and 237
3
+.hey lrielude deeLrLons rrntler8?, 94, ,99, 1oo,ri3; L26,', L28
ArtLe!.es 43, 54, 49; SL, 56, s7, 75; *i;.
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Articles 7 and 13 of the direct election act glving Parliament the right
of initiative and enabling it to reguest the introduction of the coneiliation
procedure before the implementing provlsions are lald dovrn). These speclal
rights may not be curtaiJ.ed by any adjustments made on the basls of a treaty
of acceEsion but without its participation. This requirement rms d1s-
regarded in the conclusion and ratification of the treaty of acceselon with
Greece. Parliament must irisist on the clemand it made in the resolution of
1
17 April 1980- that the council ancl the Corunission must propoee to the
Member States procedures which woulil permit conciliation to take place wlth
Parliament on such adjustments to the Treaties as would already be the
subject of a conclliation procedure in internal comnunity procedufes.
fhe conciliation procedure should also be ueed to strengthen
Parliament's infLuence in the shaping of external relatlonE policy. This
does not rule out the possibility of more far-reaching proposals on other
aspects of external relations which Parliament will discuEE on the basis
of a separate report by its Political Affairs Committee.
Your rapporteur considers that Parliament must concentrate above all
on effective participatlon in the conclugion of agreernents. The moment
the Egreenents enter into force the appropriate institution must aseume,
or reject, poJ.itical responsibiLity for the negotiated agreement. The
Council'E sole competence in this area has been likened to the unlimited
powers of the soverelgn in the days of the preconstltutional monarchy and
in no way corresponds to existing conetltutional practice in the l{ember
States.
Until Parliament participates in the ratification of agreements, aE
any elected boily representing the peopJ-e must do - though this can be
achieved only by amending the Treaties - it must at Least strengthen its
influence on the Council's decision in respect of the conclusion of such
agreements at an appropriate tlme. This would mean that lf Parliament
rejected an agreement, the Council should not enforce it until agreement
has been reached through the Conciliation Committee. Your rapporteur
suggests that the Political Affairs Comnittee ehould prepare a detalLed
report on such a procedure.
civing Parl-iament the right to influence the content of an agreement
in this manner wouLd not be entirely consistent with the powers usual.J-y
allotted to representative assedblies In foreign affairs. Normally they
1 S"" the Blumenfeld report, Doc. L-4g/8O
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can only ratify or reJect a negotlated text ag it stands. Your rapporteur
regards his proposal merely as a transitional arrangement until Euch time
as the European ParLlament is given fuIl ratlflcation rights. It ls justi-
fied by the special character of the Connunitiee whlch are stlll open to
further institutlonal change and sttll have to flndl their own Eolutlonq to
their present lnconplete conEtitutional systen.
Parliament muat be allowed to requeEt the openihg of a conclllation
procedure in thoee cases at least where the Communitlee have the power to
conclude agreenents only beeause they have asoerted responsibillty for theEe
mattero lnternally Endl &Ga-uac the- agfpement relateE to mattert $htc,tr'rrouJ.d be
subject to conclliation procedure in thelr internal leglslatlon. tn Lts
case law on the comraunities' authoitty ln external affalrs, the Court of
Jugtlce has found that, apart from cases dealt wlth orplLcltly ln the
Treaties such as the conclusion of trade agreements, thls authorlty extbnds
to those areaa in respect of whlch the,Comnunlty nas erGerclzedl the powers
allocated to it in lnternal affairs andl has lnplemented common policles'.
This congruence of subEtance between the Communltles' Lnternal and external
powers establlehed by the Court of ilustlce mugt be accompanlerl by cong,ruence
of form. This neans that when the Council acts in the conte:<t of external
relationE, it cannot refuse to open a conclllation procedure with Parllament
if it hae already agreed to concillatlon on the matter in the Connunlties'
internal leglslative procedure. Parllament must denrand that any further
internal inter-inetitutional. developnents must be matched by slni.Iar deUelop-
ments in external reLations.
16. Some of those lnvolved have shown signs of wearl.ness wtth the egnctllation
procedure in the past although this LnEtrument of cooperation between the
CounciL and Parllament has not yet been explolted to the frlI. 'llhe concilia-
tion procedure must be applied more efflciently. Endless conclllatlone,
wouLd further complicate the already cumbersome deciElon-making process of
the Communltlee. And that would not be in Parltament'E lntereEt.
The extension of thE area in which concLllatlon nay be. he1d..o"a f"r"-
fore be accompanied by a tightening up of proceduree and a more efflclent
organization of work wlthin the conclllatlon Conarlttee. An increaeed number
of concillation procedures is likely to Lead to an lncreaelngly'cunberpome
'decision-making proceas. Thlir must bo avolded by lnprovtng and perhaps
curtailing the procedure. Above all, the partles tnvolved-should remehber
the motives behlnd the ilotnt Declaratlon of 4 !,tarch Lg?sr'the'thlrd recital
of which is worded as follors: 'lilhereas the lncrease Ln the birdlEetary porrrers
of the European Parliament must be accompanled by effectlve participatlon.
by the latter ln the procedure for preparlng and adoptlng deciEl6ne'. ,Tt.t
clearly indicates the aims and purpose of conci-liatl-on, whlch,should be.
taken into account ln the practical procedure.
.:
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Your rapporteur agreeE with the Three Wise Men on the importance of
preparing more adequately for the Conciliation Committee's meetings by
arranging informal talks between the council and ParLiament. The President
of the Council, who mediates and prouides information, must play a greater
part, here. Parliament's responsibllity at thls stage iE vested mainly in
the relevant committee chairman.
With a view to the increasing number of conciliation procedures, your
rapporteur feels there is also a need for better coordination of concurrent
conciliation procedures concerning similar problems. In the past Farliament
has exerclzed self-restraint in the interest of work-saving. For instance
it did not insist on conciliation on the question of the management committees
set up under the financial protocols signed with certain Mediterranean
countries because this question had already been discussed in the conciliation
procedure in respect of regional poJ-icy and aid to ooo-isaociated developing
eountries. Parliament was content with extending the agreement reachecl in
those areas to the others too.l
It is elearly possible to determine key iEsues anil to incorporate certain
questions which constantly arl-se into a single conciLiation procedure, the
outcome of which fubuia also be valt-d-t6-i other areas. In the past two key
areas clearJ-y called for conciliation: the setting up of management committees
and the inclusion and incorporation of the Development Fund and the European
Investment Bank's financing instruments in the budget.
The negotiating procedure in the conciliation Conunittee aleo needs
improving. As a rule the procedure ls as follows: the PreEident of the
Council makes a preparatory statement, then the leader of the parliamentary
delegation puts Parliament's vie\d and finally the President of the Council
reads a second prepared statement. A meeting of this kind, which is merely
a hearing, allows for no progress in the negotiations. It is only at the
next meeting, when the two instltutlons make further adjustments to their
positions, that cornpromises can be reached. In order to tighten up and
shorten the conciLiation procedures, both sides shoul-d therefore be rep-
resented fully and the representatives should be given sufficient negotia-
ting powers to enable practical steps to be taken at the meetings to bring
the two stdes cloEer together.
Parllament for its part should do its utmost
of the contribution of its ilelegation to the work
Corunittee.
increase the efficlency
the Concillation
I 
,." the tetter from the President of Parliament to the Presldent of the
'Councll of 10.11.1978
to
of
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The duration and time-limlts of the conciliation procedure are not
clearly determined in the ,roint Declaratlon of 4 lrFrch 1975 (see paragraph
61 . Your rapporteur agrees rrlth the 'lthree Wise Men that no single par-
ticipant may declare the procedure concluded and that thiE can only be clone
by joint agreement. A tlme-limit can have a beneficial effect on the
climate of negotiations, quite apart from speedling them up. It nlght force
the particlpants to approach the negotiatlons rdth a greater sense of
urgency and encourage thern to accept compromises.. But as long as one par-
ticipant, namely the eouncll, can unilaterally delcare that the concillatlon
procedure iE concluded because the posltlons of the two sicleE are sufflclently
cloEe (paragraph 7 of the ,roint Declaratlon) thls ls only partly true, since
It means that the council is free to make a slnilar declslon on polnts of
conflict. In the case of difficult negotlations on inportant lssuee, a
deadline would therefore tend to be to Parllarnent'E dlsadvantage.
Setting a strlct tlne-limit of three months or three meetlngs as
proposed by the Three Wlee Men cannot be ln Parllament's Interest either.
Your raptrorteur prefers a flexible time-Ilnlt, to be redefined in negotia-
tlons with the CounciL. An lmproved system of this kind must, however,
take account of the need for the Councll to take deciEionE wLthln an approp-
rtate period, for the procedures not to exceed this pe rlod and for the work
load of the two instltutlons to be kept wlthin certain llmlts, whlIe also
ensuring that sufficient time is avallable for compromiEes to be reached on
ilifficult issues-
Furthermore, the council Ehou1d undertake to take a clecleion at the
end of the conciliation procedure within the tlme-I1urtt set by the
concilletion Corunlttee and not to put off unpleasant declsiona f,or too long.
BUDGE1TARY PROCEDURE
L7. 111re budget Le an area of particular Jmportance for relations betrreen
the Council and Parllament and must therefore be coverect by thie rePort,
taking into account the responsibillty of ttre Cmtittee osr Budgsts.
parliament f irst acqui-red a real sbare'of declsion-naklng Smels ln the
area of the budget under the TreatLes of 1970 and L975. llhese pcnrers are
anbodied in the amended provisions of the Erc Iteaty, the new Flnarrcial
Regulation and in supplenentary agreements, e.g. on budgetary concillation.
Ihese innovations broke new ground but it ls ncnr ti.me to follcnr up with
further steps for two reasonss firstLy, in its resolution of 13. L2.tg?lL
parliament left several important points such as the incorporatl-on of
borroring and lending activitieE into the budget and the i-nplicatione of the
new concept of commitment appropriations open to a future ruling or further
examination. Itre need for arrangements on these and other poJ.nts has becme
=-r On conciliation regarding the Financlal RegulatLon of the CmmunltieE
or No. c 6/L978, p. L9
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evident fron recent budgetary preedr:reE. Secondly, Article 107 of the Financial
Regulation itself lays down that ite prorisions Ehould be reviewed every three
yearE. the fLrst three-year period is nol up.
It is the Ccmmittee on Budgets which Ls responsible to Parllament for
this task, which would, hmever, e:ceed the scope of the present report. Ivlore''
over, it hae beccmre Parliament's cugtqt to deal with the problens w'hich have
arisen during the previous budgetary preedure by drawing up each year guidelines
deslgned to make practical improvements to the next budgetary preedure. lrhiE
too is the taek of the Corurittee on BudgetE, which will in due couree subnit to
parliament a nuober of important points relating to budgetary legislation and
practice. lIhc present report cannot and ehould not prejuclge the Cmittee's
conclusions.
Nonetheless, a report on tfre institutional relationE between CounciL and
parliament would be incorrplete without E6re reference to the area of the budget.
The epecial relationship between Council and Parliament on budgetary procedures
ie one facet of overall relations between the two inetitutions. In this ephere,
the Treaty has conferred responeibility for a central area of policy on both
Cmrrunity institutions, Council and ParLiament, jolntly. Further developeurente
in this ,pilot area' both positlve and negative, wlll therefore have a spin-off
effect on aII others and hence on overall relations between Council and
Parliament.
Although preliminary work on practical improvements in ttre area of the
budget remains the task of the Cormittee on Budgets, this report muEt, fron the
general institutional polnt of view, present the maLn linee of Parliament's
interpretation of the preEervation and neceEeary extension of its legaI Etatus
a6 one arm of the budget authority in relatlon to the Council.
18. The moEt irnportant achievement of the 1970 and 1975 budget agreements s,aa
the poler acquired by Parliament to decide in the laet instance on the level
of 'non-ccurpulsory' expenditure, withln a certain ceiling. It thus acquired
autonomous decieion-making pmers in budgetary legpislatiqr, aLbeit for only a
srnll proportJ.on of eone 2@A of total expenditure.
Hq1rever, in practice this right of decision is vulnerable on eeveral
counle, since at present lt is a pq,er which stands in isolatlon. Eo date,
parliament lacks complementary decision-naking povrera in the legislatlve fLeld,
namely with regard to the regulations and directives giving rlse to expenditure.
gere the Council contLnues to decide alone and in a way that eeriously lnpedes
the development of Parliament's newly acquired budgetary rights.
When the Councll, as it frequently does, sets a maximun rate in the
regulations in respect of which non-compulsory expenditure is incurred, it ig
inadnissibly reducing Parliament's budgetary nargin of decision. lltrls ie what
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happened reentry ln the 'energy and research' fieldll' What is particularly
seriouE here is that Regulation No. 726/79 authorizes the Council alone to
rnodify the distribution of the sectoral amounts for the various alternatlve
energygourcesbymorethant}reusualmarglnofl@.thattsabaslcencroach-
ment on Parliament's right to set priorities within ttre framework of its
decision-making porrera on thiE kind of expenditure and, for example' to
alleate mce aid to one regearch area than to another'
If the council aleo lays do{n individual regulations for each proJect
within the framework of ttre fund appropriations approred by Parriament before
the comnission can u'e these appropriaLions, it effective)-y prevents the
implementation of Parliament' s budgetary decisions'
Asaresult,thefirstprojectsunderthenon-quotasectionofEhe
Regional Fund were not apprwed until Late 1980 because the councib faiLed
to reach agreement on the individual regulatione any Eoon€r' until then'
the appropriations approved by Parliament were available only on paPer and could
not be put to the agreed PurPose'
Parliament's right to increase non-c6lPulsory expenditUre within certain
limits and to have the finar say in this respect beccsres neaninglesE lf the
approprlatlons It enters can be Epent only when and lf the councll lEeueE the
relevant regulations. llhis practice is not only inconpatiSle with the spLrit
of the innovations introduced in the budgetary agreements but ls also Lntolerable
because its main effect would be to Prevent the lmplmentation of new policies'
It is not consiEtent with the budgetary reforme of 1970 ancl 1975 that the
new, modest budgetary pq{erg granted to Parllament as t}re first step in
parllamentary coresponsibility leadlng to tlre greater deneracy desired and
recognized ae neess.rry by the l{ember states, Ehould be cr:rtalled and eig-
nificantly weakened by counciL cteciEtons outside the budgetary preedure' on
the contrary, the budgetary reform resulted ln certain indirect lirritatLons o"
the decision-making po{er of the council in the Iegislative field' to the
extent that this ie an inevitabre coroLlary to the develoPment of Parliamont'E
new budgetary pqfers. conflictLng interpretationE of ttre scope of the decLEion-
making pq,rers of council and Parliament must be resoLved by reference to thE
legaL status of @ institutions. Parliament muEt therefore continue to urge
the council to fully reEPect Parliament's right of decision over non-comPuleory
expenditure and not to undermine it by Iegislative moasurea'
-*,^o.L3o3/78andReg.No.725/7gof9.4.Lg7gfixingt-tremaximumamountof
aid for granting finarrcial 
"oppo.i f9r dgurgnsgtation 
projects In the f,leLdl of
energy 
""uitg-i; o,r No. t, 
g3/7-g, p' I.4 Reg' No' L3o2/78 and Reg' No'
726/79 fixing the naximot 
"toorrt Lf "fffion granting financial 
support f,or
projects to exploit aLternati".-anerEry so,:rc6s i  O, No. I, 93/79
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19' A further inportant innovation in the buclget agreements of rgzo and r9z5is Parrlament's right to deriver a diecharge to the cqunlssion in respect ofthe inplementation of the budget, under Article 206(b) of the EEC Treaty. Itreeffective exercise of thie right is threatened by the ,managenent cqruritteepreedure,.
with a view to the use of the appropriations entered uy naruament,the CounciL makes management cornmltteeE available to the Commlsdlon. They
are made up of representattves of the Menber states and are responslble forassisting the commission in itE taek of inprementing the appropriateprovisions.
l'tanagement comurittee and committee on ruLes procedures have become
common practlce eince 1958 and take different forms dependlng on the fieldtof application. rn its juclgrment of L7 December 1g7o the court of irusticedecrared them compatible in princlple with the Treaty. your rapporteur
will therefore not oarr them into questlon as euch, since they are general.ly
regarded as havlng proved useful and even aa havtng etrengthened the
commiseion's position. tt'hat is of lnterest here is the uEe of management
comrnittees in a marginar area where pollcy-rnaking (for which the councilis responsible) and poricy imprenentation in line rdth the buctget (for whichthe cornmission is responsibLe under parll.anent,s control) are almost ln-extricably inter-woven.
rn many areas of, regional policy and energy and research polrcy the
comniunity mereJ.y aasessea certain proJects tn termE of whether they are worthdeveloping and supporting. This can apply both within the community and tothe comnunity's rgrations wlth thircr countries, especiarly deveroprng
countries' And in every case it Ls a question of who has the right to declde
on lndividual applications, i.e. to grant the funds.
The commlttee procedure is generalJ-y used to reach a compromlse betweenthe respectlve terms of reference of the council and the commlseion. The
commission decldes, after consulting the conmlttee; the council retaine therlght, however, to decide afresh under certqin circurqstances and thus tolnvalldate the Cornmlssion,e declgion in aone casea. Under ttre regrulaticns ggr
support for proJects to exploit alternative energy source, for instance, a
Member state slmply er:bmits an applJ-catLon and the councll itseu takes adecigion instead of the courriesior. rhe prorisions of the regulation onfinancial ard to non-asseiated developing countries prevent the conunresion
from approrring project apprications. Even if neither the management ccuurittee
nor' in the seeond tnstance, the council to which the comrittee has referredthe question, approve the project within a specific time linit, arl the
comniEsion can do iE sr:bsrit new proposals. E:<anples can aLso be quoted of the
council reserving itself the right of decisLon from the outset.
-33- PE 67.o24/, tLn.
llhe guarrel whlch flares up tlme and again on thls question lraE its
roots In the dual nature of decisions on projects. It Ehould be noted that
political factors also play a part in the decision, particularly in the caEe
of projectg in third countries but euch decisione are prfunarily budget
implementation acts within the meaning of Article 2O5 of the EEC Treaty,
since the decision on an application fon aid involves the comritment of
appropriations. Such a decisj-on Is clearly an implementing act subject to
the lLmlts and condltlons laid dqrn in detail in the segulations.
rt" co*rtssion iE, of course, reapongible for impleunentlng the 5pn3et
(Article 2O5 of the EEC Treaty). Ilere, it ls not exerclzing powers con-
ferred on it by the Council (fourth inclent of ArtIcIe l-55 of the EEC Treaty) '
but has itE own power of actlon and declsion under the EEC Treaty (thircl
lndent of Artlcle I55). To this end it ie accountable to Parll-ament whick
must give it a discharge (Article 2O6b of the EEC Treaty). Furthentore,
both the Council and the CommiEsion have confitmed that the new version of
Article 32 of the Financial Regulation which moreclosely dletermlnes the
cornrnitment of appropriations cannot be interpreted as meaning that an
institution other than the CommisEion can implenent the buclget or grant
financial support from the individual fundE'
The new Article 206b of the EEC Treaty revised by the 1975 Treaty
amendlng certain rinanci,il provlsions glves Parliament the task of controlJ'lng
the implementation of the buclget and giving the CommissLon a dllecharge'
ParLiament can in fact controL the budlget only If the CommissLon hne some
power of decision on its inrplementation. This control wouLd be superfl'uous
if the Comntsslon's taBk wEre confLned to book-keeplng and cash manag€nent.
Parllament must urge the Council to leave thls decision-maklng power
to the CommiEEion. Othemise Parliament's rlght 6f control aver the
Commission would become virtual.ly meaning!.ess, since the najor budget
implementation meaEureg would be decidedl by the councll, over whon
Parliament has no control. In its answer of 9 October 1978 to a questlon
on this matter, the Commission made lt cLear that recent further developments
in the management conrnittee procedure were approaching the Llmits of what
was admissibLe under Article 2O5 of the EEC Treaty and that it pref,erreil
the system of purely consultative commlttees Euch as the social Fund
Consultative Committee. They would be more likely to enable lt to fulfll
its tasks ln the approprlate manner.
That is why the Councll should In prlnciple conflne the activltles
of the management conmittees which aEEiEt the Commlselon to purely con-
sultative functions anil not introduce procedures which detract from the
Comrnission's responsibiLity to lmplanrent the budget. The only exeeptione
could be foreign-po}icy decielons (e.g. aidl for non-asEocLated developlng
countries) involvlng diplonatic questlons.
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shourd the counclL continue to assert that decisions on indivtduaLproject applications are essentiarry poriticar acts for whlch tt tsprimarlly responsible, and not budget lnplenentatlon acts for which the
commiEeion is responsible under the Treaty, then parrlanent nust insist
on belnE involvcd in the councit'e decLelon-takLng on baatc porlcy regardllngthe commitment of ald appropriatlone Ln the same vray as it has been rnvorvedin generar legisrative acte with flnanclal imprications slnce the JointDeclaration on the conciliatlon procedure of 4 l{arch 1975. Eowever, the
most recent regulation on financiar aid to non_asseiated devel0plng
countries' referred to abover Provides only for parliament to be consurted
on the annual basic poricy. Ttris ie not enough. parriament cannot acceErtbeing e:rcIuded frorr both effective budgetary control and frmr determlningthe content of such decisions.
Finalry, reference should be nade to a fr:rther aspect arising fronthe new flnancLal 
-aystem of the cmmunLties introduced in 1g70 and 1975.
since Parllament le nqrt the lnstitutLon which ls requlred to keep watch
over the imprementation of t'e budget and to give the diecharEJe, the
council no ronger has the right to freeze the budget against the wirl ofParriament and, the comnlseion. Transfers of appropriatlonE are a basic
element of Parliament's decision-maklng structure and the Financial Regulatlon
should be amended accordingly.
20' The 1970 and 1975 budget reforms made the council and parliament partnerswith equal etatus and egual rlghts ln one and the same budget authority.Parriament must deuand that this eguality ie also eetablished as regardEreciprcal infornation and pr,rbricity so that it can furfir its duties. 
'*rlsappries flratry to information on th€ wishee s,.bnitted by the otherinstitutions to the budgetary authorlty on their admrnLstrative budgets.
rhey shourd eubnit their d,euments to the councir and parliament at the sameltne so that ParlLament is arso furry inf,ormed about the original apprications
and can take due account of then if lt later decides to amend the draftbudget' Parliament must be given the authority to e:ramine carefurry theobiective requlrements of the adminiEtrative budgets of arl the organs andlnstitutions' rtrie means that the council must provide parliament with eound,complete and cr-ear reasons for approving or rejecting expenditure appriedfor by the other institutions.
However' this also applies to information on the council.s derlberatimein its capacity ac' an arm of the hudget authority. lrhe councll shouLd Ln futr:regive Parrlament access to the minutes of meetings of the councir and of thePermanent Representatives at which nattere pertainlng to the br$et are dis-cussed' onry by ensuring that each arm of the budgetary authorlty is lnformed
about the delilcerations of the other, will it be possible to prevent thecouncil fron taking advantage of always being one step ahead in thie respect.
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2L. As a result of the budget reform, the revised version of Article'203
of the EEC Treaty makes the Council and ParLiament jolntly responsible for
the successful inplementation of the budgetary preedr:re. Prcnrisions on the
drafting of the budget, which nay be subject to doubt or variouE inter-
pretations, muEt be resolved j-gint1E by the council and Parli.ament. ReEPect
for the epirit and the letter of Article 203 of the EEC Treaty is an
essont,ial prerequieite for a constructive dialogue within the budget autbority.
22. lltre practical furplesrentation of the budgetary preedure requires close
coordination of the work of the Council and Parliament. Despite the aqreed
conciliation between the Council and Parliament, recent budgetary'preedures
have proved inadequate in irnportant areias and unsatisfactory for the posJ-tion
of Parliament. lltris applieg, for instance, to the treatment of Parliament'E
indl-vidual draft amendments on speciflc non-cmpulsory expenditure, the
establishment of a new maxirrum rate of increase in non-corpulsory expenditure
and the method of dealing wlth comltment appropriations. In the rapponteur's
view, Parliament must call for further i.mprovement to the vital coordLnation
of the work of the Council and ParLiament during the budgetary preedure.
As mentioned aborre, the cotrmittee on Budgets will submlt practical proposals
ln this area.
23. As recent experience has ehodn, the already difflcult budgetaty preedure
has been eubjected to addltional strain sLnce certain basic lssueE were not
clarified beyond dloubt or to the satiefaction of Parliarnent in the budget
reforrn of 1970 and 1975. llhese issues include the structure of the budget,
the inclusion of all financing instruments, the dlstinctlon betueen compuleory
and non-copulsony expenditure and the budgetary treatment of appropriationE
for multiannual projects. Parliament should take this opportunity to euphasize
once again the need to settle these outstanding matters by concillation with
the Council 
-g!g!1!9 the budget preedure. Parliaglent will In any case adopt
an opinion on this subject in due course based on the practical proposals
for improrrements to be made by its Cmittee on Budgets.''
24. Finally, the inevitable conseguences must be drawn fron the truisn that
all budgetary deisions are also polltical deciEions or must be cmpatible
with them. Frcrn the outeet, Parliament has therefore interpreted and exercieed
its right to participate in ttre budgetary preedure as particlpation in poLicy;
naking. It must demand that the other arn of the budget authcrity takes this
into account and i.s always fully responsiJcle pollticalLy and capable of
reaching decisions.
The division of the CounciL into a nurnber of CouncLls responEible for
specific areas of policy 
- which is dealt with in greater detail in the
follo.ring section 
- 
muEt not be allmed to result in tJre Council of Finance
I'linisters avoiding decisions *ling to considerations relating to another area.
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parliament can justifiabry expect to negotlate with a poriticar partner
in the budgetary preedure and not with a second-rate councrr.
The 'council's' leglslative and bu(tgetary decisions nu5t be conslstent.
rn recent budgetary preeduree the council has on varLous ecaslone dereted
certain expenditure regar&d aE necessary and entered in the preriminarydraft by the connisEion, without withdrawing the policy decislone contalnedin the basic regulations- Thie was the case for regional, seial and energypolicy. rhe councll oritted to draw the budgetary conclueions frm ite cnnlegislatlve deieions and to approve the neessary payment appropriatione
in keeping with poriclee introduced and cmiturent appropriations arready
authorized' rn euch caBes, Parriament can re-enter the missing appropriationsfron its nargin of manoeuvre but the funpact on policy it was intended to
have is thereby lost slnce virtuarry alL Parliament,s margin of manoeuvre goes
tcxlards makLng up the necessary funds f,or policies which the councll decidedbut ie unwilrlng to finance and cannot be used to provide an inpetus for newporicies. lrtris curtails Parllament's right of innwation. Irhe council thus
conceale its true intentlons and thls ls not acceptable to parliament.
Parriament must lherefore demand that the guestion of political responsi-bilities be made entirely clear.
25' The councll must take a number of internal neasures to improve rts
work' rt is not rcithin the scope of this report, which dears ryrth relationEbetween Parliament and the councir, to submit proposal.s on all the problems
of the councll's internaL actlvities. rn this connection parliament confineeitserf to urgentry requesting the council to carry out the overdue reforusto lts internar structure and working methods, taking account of the proposalsof the Three Wise Men.
rn certarn areas, horrever, the councir,s working procedures dlrectlyaffect the ablrity to act of the other instltutions. Irlhere they affectParliament's position in reratton to the other coranunity lnstitutions, thisreport notes the changes that must be made to lmprove the coopera6 on betweenthe institutions and restore them to the functlone raid dortrn for them bythe Treaties.
26- rt the community rnstltutions are once agarn to work togetlier rn abalanced rray, in line with their functlons, the voting procedure In the
council must be reformed. Parl-iament must repeat its denands for a returnto the TreatleE- Following the 1966 Luxenbourg compromise, the councirdeparted from the voting procedure lald donn in the Treaties. That meansthat if a !{ember state asserts that very important natlonar Lnterests areat stake in a certain issue, the councir. contrnues to negotiate, even in
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cases where majority decisions can be t"t.r, uiaer the
agreement has been reached between all !,!ember States.
can be raached, no ilecision is taken.
Treaties, until
ff, no such agreement
The Luxernburg compromlse was clrafted at a tlme when much effort rrae
still being put into building the Comunity. At that time lntegration
decisions were the maln issue. Uncler the timetable for the transltional
period, the Councll had to lntroduce Conununlty rules ln the vari.oue Treaty
iEeBSr e.g. organir.tion' oi ttt"-.gtiooitirraf markets. Ilowever, the
l,tember States coulil tolerate a greater degree of integration only lf thls
di.d not conflict wlth important natLonal interests. Any 'acguis
communautaLre' was baeed on declsions taken unantmously or by majority
vote with fhe-agieeurent of all concerned. The same applles to the new
policies introduced on the basis of Artlcle 235 of the EEc Treaty.
Even today, looking realistically at the structure of legitination
and power withln the European Community, it does not eeem that a government
can be outvoted in any issue of partlcular nationaJ. iurportance. However,
this should apply only to 
'vital' lssues, whlch must be acknorledged as
exceptions. In any case the Communlty has no adequate lnstruments at lts
disposal to compel a Merober State to lnplenent a uaJoiity declEion on Lts
territory. Whlle the Luxembourg conprmise had a recognizable function as
an emergency brake in enceptional circunstances agalnst any move torrards
integration which ran counter to the vltal interests of a !4ember State, lt
is a guite unsuitable lnstrument to apply to decieions that must be taken
as between dlfferent poJ.icies at the exi.Eting 1eveJ. of lntegration nor must
it be appJ-Ied as a rule.
It is not so much the prlnciple behlnd the Luxembourg compromlse that
ls a hindrance to comnrunity activity ae the fact that it iE no longer
applied aE an exceptlon but as a rule. The effect of thts ruLe ls accen-
tuated by the fact that norr the running-ln period has come to an end the
Council increaeingly exercizes J.egislative and administrative rather than
guiding functlons.
As provided for in the Treaty, everyday politlcal disputes at Community
Ievel must be able to be resolved by majorlty decleion. Agricultural pollcy
decisione, for Lnstance, rarely involve the setting up of organizatLons of
the market but relate more often to annual prLce adjustments.
Why should one lttember State be allowed to prevent a prlce rlse proposed
by the commiEElon by referrlng to ltE vital intereEts whllE a rnajorlty of
Member States, aLso invoking important interests, cannot do so? The absurd
reEult of thls kind of procedure is not protectlon of the minorlty but the
dictatorshlp of the mj.nority over the najority. The Councll must therefore
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revert to the decleion-rnaking procedures stlpulated ln the TreatleE as the
normal rule. Thls is partlcularly necessary In yiew of the further enlarge-
ment of the Community, which will act as a further burden on the declslon-
making structures.
It i.s qulte conceLvabLe that a return to the procedures laid down In
the Treaties could be achieved In stageE. E<perience has shown that the
veto !s used lndiscrimlnately, even on non-vital Lssues. Ihe Parls Sunnlt
conference called for self-restraint to avold thll-auus.l-'lut wtthout ,oii-
succeas. Sone progreeg could be made lf Mernber States only referred to
important interests in the caEe of really vital l6Eues and [f thls practlce
remal-ned the exceptiona Nor is it reaeonable to etlow each llmber State
to decide this question iteelf. It must take the troubLe to Justlfy lts
case and open it for discusglon. The obligation to Justtfy each ease
would make it clear that this procedure devlates from the votlng rules
lald dorn in the Treaties. It lrould place the political ree3lonslblllty
for the posslble fallure to adopt a deciston squarely oo the ghoulderE of
'the government concerned and mlght persuade all concerned to regort to the
veto only In s<treme cases.
I{hen the councll decldes on propoEals whlch Parllanent hle endoreed
by a large urajorlty, the veto shoulcl ldteally not be uEed at a1I. In Euch
cases the Councll and ParLiament should Jointly d6flne the type of mjorlty
and procedures which precrude any appear to vrtar dnterests.
27. Pursuant to Article 148 (3) of the EEC Treaty, abstentlon does not
Prevent the adoption of, unanlmous decislons. Abstentlon is therefore a
good way for a Member State to expreEo reservations on the grounds of
natlonal consideratlonE without bloeklng the cornmualty cleclsion. The
Member Stated are therefore urged to mEke nore freguent use of abetentlon
if national pollcy regervatlono prevont them frorn voting Ln favour of, a
declsion.
28. It is in Parllament3e basic lntereEt for the CouncLl's internal
structure to becone nore efflcient. closdr coordinatlon of the various
Councils and more systerrratic supervlelon of, the cqnmittees and worklng
partles reeponslble to the Council are requlrecl If the Councll is to work
effectively and really play lts part ln the lnstltutional etructure of the
Comrnunity. The TreatLes refer only to the councll in the sLngular. The
. 
Council, and not the Coupctls, is Parllament'E and the CmnLselon's partner.
rn fact the Councll takes varloue forms and acts at various levele through
the departnents accountable to lt and eet up by it. your raptorteur does
not dispute the fact that the Councll must take a dlfferent form from caEe
to caae, dependlng on the area lnvolved, and must set up worklng parties
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and Gcunlttees it ft le to operate In f,ull'knowledge of the fact€. That Ls
precisely why a speclal system of horj.aontal coordiaation must be Introduaed -
so that, for instance, the Councll of ltLnteters of Agriculture aEnftot f,it(
agrioultural lrlces In dlefl.aace of, the Gouncll of Fluance ,ltlnl,stete -
together with a -b€ttar*qyatem,of verttcal control, to essute-,that,ceE@'Lo
natters do not get bqggd down in comnlttee and the deci..gton+nalolng Btro(les8
ls not delaYed.
In your rapporteur'.s vLfl the chlef roeponsibillty f,or coordlnatton
lies with the Counell of trorelgn lUlnLsters and tbo r,elerrant presldent-ln-
Office. That does not-mean we are calllng ln questl-on the 'dlfferent
tradltional dlepartmental hlerarchi.es ,in the Meuber Stsates or glvlfig,ttae
Forelgn Iuinisters the naln responslbllity f,or ,European pollcy. 'But for
practlcal work at Connunity level, a alear.syeten of tltatll.buti.on of
responsibtliti,es must be f,aund. llhe Forelgn'&Ii'rLlsters In the Cmnunlty
are also reslnnstble for ioetltutlonal "questione, apatr, frorr thelrother
speciflc responstbillties, and thus forthe functioning of the Communlby
as a whole. That Is why the Council of Foreign lr[nlsters LE the .most
suitable coordlnatlng body. It Ls up to Lhe Councll and "the Mernbsr 'States
to def,lne thLe task more closely .anil to tEke ,tlre egprs[rriJate,rtrGta€ures. It I
ehould be renenbEred, Ln thls context, that at the 197'4 ermntt oonfErence
the Eeads of State fornally conferred on the ,Forelgn ulniaters en inaerttlve-
glving and cordlnating roIe.
29. It ls in Ear,lLament's i'nterest for the Councll to be rel,leved of cer:taln
taekE ln order to have 'tlme for its ,ruain task: to 'adopt g'enee1 lrclicy
declsions after careful dl'scusslon and aoor.dlnatLoa of the vartous rgrointa
of view. That is why the Councll should nore.frequently transf,er ;rowers to
the .Corunieslon to lmplmant the rules lt has l,aid dorrn, 'aE.provldad 'for in
Attlcle 155 of the EEC 'Treaty. If the,eouncil dlelegates powere to tha
Comnission, h&rever, it ,should do so comprehensiue.Ly and onty rasort to the
management comnj.&tae lptrocedure ln axceptl,onsl ca.sE6. t$e leEr8@rrdd 'to .the
epeclal problen,oE,1m$$.sucantfng ,e@suaes conneted rtth the budget 'in
paragraph 23. ?he council r*111 have even mor€ need to be reliieved ci'f, soine
of the burden of, itE wotk nory thbt Co@untty activtt'les ,stre lncreael,ag l*r
scope and incorporattng further n6h, areas.
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Minority opinion on the dlraft rE)ort on relations bettreen the European
parliament and the councll of the European comnunities
A Danish meniber of the Group for ttre TschnicaL Coordination and
Defence of Independent CEoupe and Members holdE tfue opinion that
election of the European ParLiament by direct universal suffrage should
not be acconpanied by any increase in its porers or influence.
Such a development would, he feels, be contrary to the interests
of tlre Folketing and would wealen its control over Comnunity po}iql.
similarly, tlre councll's practlce of adopting only unanimous
Idecisions muit continue, in order ttrat the Danish member may alone, at
Ithe directio4 of the Folketing, blod< any decision.
Ttre minority opinton also opposes any extenEion of conciliation
procedure and any increase in tlre Cmnrnlty' otn lesources.
l
I
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Opinion of the LeEal Affairs Comnittee
Draftsman : lttr C. PROUT
On 25 t{arch 1980, the Political. Affairs Cormittee received authorisation
to draw up an iniLiative. report on relations between the European
Parlianent and the Council of the Community.
I'tr Prout wae provisional-Iy. appointed draftsman at the Legal Affairs
Committee's meeting of 2 october 1980.
the Legat Affairs Comittee was fonrnaLl-y authorised to draw up an
opinion by letter of 26 January 198L.
It exa,mined the draft opLnion at tts neetlng of 25/26 Febnrary and
L3/L4 April 1981; at the latter neeting, it adopted it wlth Io votee in
favour, 2 against and 4 abstentions.
Present: Mr Ferri, Chairman; Ur Lu6t6r, &tr Eurnsr and Mr Chanbeiron,
Vice-{hairmeni Mr Prout, DraftEnan; Mr Balfe; ltr8 Boot; t'ir Da Gudrti
tilr Goppel; ttlr Gouttrler; &1r PlaEkovitLsl Mr SleglersdrnLdltl Ur f1qreII;
lrtr VardakaEi DlrE Vaygsade, I'1r Vt6.
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1. On 25th l,larch 1980, the Political Affairs Comnittee was authorised
to draw uP an orn-.initiative report on relations between the European
Parliament and the Corrncil of Ministero. The Legal Affaire Committee
was authorised to draw up an opinion by a letter of January 26L]n, 1991.
In the time available to us, therefore, vre can only conment very
generally.
2. The Legal Affsira conmiLtee regreUs the terme of reforenC6 of the'Report
were confined to Parliament and council. The commission forme an
integral Part of tJre legi-slative process, possessing considerable pqrers,
and the way in whlch its.poriticar relationship with parriament
develops is critical to the grcnrth of Parliament's chrn po!{er. Until the
implicatiors of the Commission' s ultimate polltical responsibility to
Parliament under Article L44are fully explored an examination of the
relationship between Parliament and Council is bound to be incomplete.
Consultat ion
3. On 17 Aprll I98O, the Legal AffairE Conmittee was asked to draw up
an ohrn init,iative report on the consurtatlon of the European
Parliament iyr the light of the judgements to be given by the court of
Justice in the "IsogJ-ucoEe cases" (L3g/79 and t3g/79). The parliament
had, on an inltiative by the Legar Affairs co:runittee, intervened in
support of the submissj.ons by two private parties that Rggulation no.
L293/79 of 25 ,Iune 1979 be declared vold because parliament had not yet
e:tpressed its opinion. The Court has ncn, decided in Parliament'E favour
and the Legal Conraittee is &afting its report.
4. we berieve Lt wouLd not be expediant for the poLitical Affairs
Committee to anticiFgte any conclusionE on consultation until the Iegal
Affairs conrmittee has reSnrted on the matter. It is vital that parLiament's
opLnLon on thLs cnrcl.al issue should be e:rpresEed j-n tha clearest possible
!{ay. This would not ba ttre case if it were fragmented and duplicated in two
different docunentE. Further, the issue must, in the opinion of the Lega1
Af,faLrs CommLttee, be conEidered in the contqrt of, the changes ln the Rules
of Procedure of the European Parlianent contained in the report of, l{
I{r R. Luster (Doc. 1-926/80) at nrlea 32 - 39 and pa::agraphs 2l - 32 of t}re
explanatory statoent.
Codecision:
5. The develoPnent of the European Conununities involves a trangfer of
PcEvers from I'tlember states to connunity Institutione in the belief that
certain matters are better dealt with in cotmnon than by each Member
state separately. rn all our Member states, legislative pcnrer ie
exercised by democratically elected Parliaments. one of the consequences
of th! transfer of porer is a decline in democratic decision-making
because the European co[ununities' main decision-making body is the
Council composed of Member Governmonts.
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It is true that national reprgsentatives on the Council are themselves
elected democrati.caIly. But the decisions they take are the final part
of a legislative proceas in which national ParliamentE have not
participatad. Any loss of poeere by national parliamentE in thlE
respect must be c'onpenaated for by a corresponding increase of the
porers of the European Parliament. In our opinion, the guarrels concerning
nationaL sovereignty are mLsplaced. The real battle is to sfrgtiln-. the
principles of representative government.
6. The Legar Affairs comnittee agrees with !{r HBnsch in paragraph I (b)
that the most promising basis for progress is that sectiun of the final
declaration of the Paris Sunrnit of L9?4 in which the Heads of State and
Government expreas th6ir intention to e:Gend the European Parliament,g
po^rers,in particular by granting it certain porers in the Corrununity
legisrative proceas. we also think that, in the abse-ce of any actlon
by the Heads of State and covernment folloring thie declaration,
Parliament must take the political inltiative in thiE fiefa. (1)
7. What ttrig
An ill-juclged
Report ehould
Irhoge content
Sn1itical lnltiative should be neads carefirl consLderatLon.
mone could danage the European Parlianent. The E8nsclr
be regarded as a very usefirl basLg to a fuller anatlele
the Iegal Committee would not wish to ant{clpate.
8. rt lrourd be wrong. to assume that the only way to increase the ptrera
of Parliament ls by Treaty Amendment. lhe Legal conunittee berieves, asits remarks on conciriation and Majority voting berory denonstrate, thatthe opport,unitiee to e:rptoit rights that we alreadv have under theTreaty have not yet been fulJ.y utilised. Moreover, there is the
alternative procedure of Joint Declaration which gave birth, for example,to the Conciliation procedure. 
,
9. Eurther, provJ.ded franenork directives contaLn a provLsLon that
regurations made thereunder by the connission Ehould ba subJect of
eonsultation of tlre European ParlLanent, wcre Lt to aek for tt nrlt5in
a set deadlLne, greater use couId, be nade of tlrq.
10- Last, but by no neans least, there ig the possibilrty of acquiring
polvers by custom. This is by the develotrment of working practices batseenthe institutions which each cmes to recognr-Ee ae of blnding authority.A recent example of this, iE the acceptance by the connlssion of tlreprincipre that statements of intent made by the commisgLoners in parriament
on the latter's amendments before a vote are subseguentry bindlnE on the
commission' The history of aLL our denocracies lllustrate the sLgnLficance
of this gradubl approach.
11' lrha r'egal AffairE cornmittee decrares itself, Ln agreenent wLttr paragraph 23of lrtr E$nsch.e dfrft report.
-
\rrsee amenfuent to paragraph I.b
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conciligtion
12. The Legal Affaj-rs Comrittee does not wish to submit formal proposals
for amendmenta .on. these two chapters before congulting the Budgets
Committee. It will confine itself to making two genaral observations:
Firstly, the conciliation procedure, which is of the hlgheet importance
for the Europe4n Parliament, is by its nature cumbersome, and requires
careful preparation by both delegations which comprise the 'Conciliation
comnittee'. A rnultipl.ication of conciliation procedures, therefore, is
undesirable. The procedure should only be opened for questione of the
greatest importance.
13. Secondly, attention must be drawn to paragr:?ph 7 of the joint
declaration setting up the conciliation procedure (1):
When the positions of the two institutions are Eufficiently close,
the European Parliament may give a new opinion, g[@. which the
Council' shall take definitive action' .
This text means that the Council cannot act when the positions of the
two sides of the Coneil-iatlon Committee are not sufficiently elose. It
cannot be objected that paragraph 6 of the joint declaration preecribes
a period of three months for the procedure to be accomplished, because
the wording of that paragraph ("The procedure should normally take place
during a period..."). shors that the deadline is not mandatory. Thls view
is reinforced by the fact that an exception to the general rule is
provided for in the'Eame paragraph of the joint declaration, which
etipulates that "the Council may fix an appropriate time lfmit" if
"the act in question has to be adopted before a specific dtte or if the
matter is urgent".
I'laiority Votinq
L4. Like the European Parliament, the Council of the European CorununitLes
has the po,{er to adopt its cnrn rules of procedure (see article 151 of the
EEC Treaty). That means that the Parliament has no legaI right to ask for
modifieation of the Council's internal- working methods. Nevertheless,
autonomy in fixtnq Lts Rules cannot permit it to breach Treaty prorrisions.
As a resuLt of the 'Luxembourg agreement' of L965, the Council has
abandoned the majority principle enshrined in the Treaties. In fact,
Article 148, para. 1, of the EEC Treaties is so drafted:
"1. Save as othenvise provided in this Tr6aty, the Council shall
act by a majority of its members".
(1) See OiI No. C 89, 22.4.L975, p.2
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The effect of thiE text,ie that, where a majority vote is provided for
in the Treaty, tb,a Cou.ncil is obliged not to let iteelf be inurobitized
by the lack of, unaninity. The Treaty system haE as ite basis that,
unlike in decision-naking bodies of most international organiEatione, in
the Council of the Comtunities differences of opinions muEt be composed
in a vote: when the required majority exists, the minority shall have
to comply with tbeir position. The practical effect of the ,Luxemborrg
agreement' is that, because the Council does not vote any more, it does
not take a deciEion bn m"tters for which there ie no unanimity, thus ,,
prejudicing the rights. of those l,lember stateE which are in a majority,
of the comniegiou,. the author of the p4opgeF!, and of the parlianent when
it has expressed its opinion thereon. Ttre Legal Affaire cornnrlttee
rerninds the Politicar Affairs committee that, where appropriate, the
comnission, each Menber state or the European parliament nay bring an
action before the court of JuEtlce when the counclr t-ils to act in
infringement of the EEC Treaty (Eee Article 175).
PROPOSED A!{ENDMENTS
Proposed New Te:rt
conscious that since the Communityis a union of denocratic states
every decision that it talces must
be in the interest both of the
Community and of the individual
llember States, and that theee
trvo components of the decision-.
making proceEs must be repre-
sEnted in a balanced manner,
whereas the Council of the European
Communities renains the Comnunityinstitution whlch represents the
nation stateg of the CmnunJ.ty,
Undranqed
- wheleaE Ure councll of the
EuEo[rean CornnunLtLes renal,ng
the Communlty LnstitutLonthat conslsts of representatlves
of the &Iqber Stateg,
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Paraqraphe
26. points out that tle work of theCouncil has a direct impact on the
effectiveness of the inlreasingactivities of parliament in paitic_
ular and the Conununity in geireral;
and accordingly urges the Council toset in hand the long overdue reform
of its internal structure and workiog
methods in the light of the numerousproposals made, for instance, in thereport of the 'Ehree WiEe &len' ; .t ,"
f[!g!-lnS_-Text
I$,t.t Recalls the final commlnigu6
of the paris Surnrrit Confe.tro,lco 
_ill.* .,.",.,
the council would return to.*iof,l*$";;.decision-making, and the
the decision-making procedures
stipulated in the Treaties as the
normal rule;
(b) Demands that the claim by a
!,lember State than an issue is of
'vita1 interest
,, shouldbe recognised as an exceptional case
requiring justification by thedelegation concernedr egpecially inthe case of proposals that have bean
endorsed by a large najority ofthe European parliament,
[7. Urges members of the council to
make more frequent uee of abstentionin order to facilitate decisionsi
4I-
bv a raiorr--v of. iEETEtffi--
al'.
,.;l
Prop_osed t{Gv Te*t
demand of March IgZg for a .eFrur,,l,-t0,;, -
majority decisions before tJr6_qftqond 
_ ,
anlr*-^-^:I ^4 !L^ ^------!ren)argement of the Comnr:a,ity, ?rC.. ..calle upon the Council to revert to
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